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The trend toward the liberalization of financial markets is part of
a general recognitioni  that free markets normavlv  work betterthan
goverinient conitiols. Regulatory systems should be developed
itn lighit of the market falilures that make them necessaryv  and
should provide the least possible opportunity for rent extraction
by any single interest group.
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In recent years there has been a trend towird  liberaliz-  control to market-based pricing. Market trading
ing linancial markets in developed and emerging  systems must be supervised to prevent market
securities markets. In the United States, the Securities  manipulations ana insider trading based on privileged
Act Armcndments  of 1975 emphasized competition in  information. Govcrnments are better employed
the provision of fnancial  services by deregulating  educating investors about the risks and rewards of
commission rates on stock transactions and by  owning marketable securities than in trying to
fostering the development of a national market system  determine the prices ol those securities.
in securities. London's so-called "big bang" series of  e  Restrictions on entry into the financial services
major reforms in 1986 deregulated commission rates,  sector are appropriate to the extent that they arc
put a new trading system on the stock exchange, and  concerned xA  ith capital adequacy and measurable
allowed foreign financial service firms to participate  competence  -the  goal being to correct possible
more in the U.K.'s domestic securities market.  market failures.
Changes in the U.K. were far-reaching in a short  *  Restricting foreign ownership of shares is not
period, so Chuppe and Atkin could examine their  justified by econotnic theories of regulation. Markets
effects on the market - particularly on competition.  can develop more easily if foreign institutions are
They found that the big bang made London more  allowed to invcsi at the same time that domestic
cf-'T  ?ctitive as a global financial center.  institutions are encouraged to develop. The Korean
Aftcr examiring trends in UJ.S.,  U.K., Japanese,  market has developed despite an interventionist
Korean, and several emerging markets, Chuppe and  regime in charge of stock market development, but
Atkin conclude that securities markets can facilitate  there is no evidence that cntry barriers faced by new
the efficient allocation of an economy's resources and  providers of financial services have donc morc than
can foster competition in the financial sector by  increase the profits of cxisting providers.
providing an alternative to government-directed  *  Developing countries eager for their developing
funding or a supplemcnt to private funding through  markets to be a link to the world capital market
the banking systems. For securities markets to  cannot afford to ignore the trend toward an interna-
allocate resources to their most productivc uses, they  tional harmonizing of regulatory structurcs. There has
conclude, regulation should be confined to that  hecn a tendency in recent years to strengthen govern-
needed to correct the market failures that arise in  meint  oversight ol markets, with an appropriate
unregulated markets. This has several important  delcgation of regulatory responsibility lo stock
implications:  exchanges or other sell-regulating organizations.
* It is more desirable to allow the market to set  *  In countries moving from centrally planned to
prices than to have direct government intervention in  market economies, the basic building blocks for a
the pricing and selection of issues. But market-based  securities markets must be established, along with
prices depend on investors having access to reliable  appropriate regulatory safeguards. Private property
financial information, which means standardized  rights must bc delfined,  adequate accounting systems
accounting rules and clear disclosure requirements  established, and specialized institutions developed to
must be in place as a market moves from government  act as broker, dealer, and investment banker.
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This paper is part of a planned series of research on the performance of
capital markets and their  role in  providing risk capital to the corporate sector
in India and  the Republic  of Korea.  The research  is funded by  the Bank's
Research Committee (RPO 675-84).
The views  expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and
should not  be attributed to the  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
the  World Bank group, its  Board of Directors, its  manageiiment  or any of its  member
countries.  The SEC, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement by any of its employees.Regulation of Sectirities  Markets:
Some Recent Trends and their Implications for Emerging Markeus
Recent  rapid  changes  in  the  world  economy,  particularly  the
transformation of command economies into free market economies in many places
around the world, can be expected to lead to an increase in the number of newly
created securities  markets  throughout the  1990s.  This  follows  a decade of
unprecedented change in the world's securities markets.  The 1980s witnessed a
rapid expansion  in  the securities markets  of both  developed  and developing
countries, cross-border investment flows increased sharply, and there was quite
widespread  regulatory  reform  or  liberalization.  Reflecting  these  trends,
cross-border  securities transactions  (gross purchases and sales) between the
U.S., the  world's largest securities market, and other countries increased from
$251.2  billion  to  $5.5  trillion  over  this  period.  The  twin  trends  of
liberalization and  globalization,  of course,  affected  not  only securities  markets
but the global financial markets as a whole.  Generally speaking, regulatory
regimes became n.ore  open and competitive as more  liberal regulatory policies
tended to replace government controls or private cartel arrangements.
In the 1990s, we expect that increased attention will be given to newly
established  and  emerging  securities  markets 1l  as  a  result  of  the  historic
movement toward free market economies in central Europe and the Soviet  Union and
the need for  more efficient capital  markets to  support the expanding role of the
private  sector  in many  developing  countries  around  the  world.  Given  the
importance of the regulatory environment to capital market development,  this-2-
paper  focuses  on  the regulatory  issues.  It examines  the  interplay between
regulation and market efficiency and reviews recent developments in regulation,
paying particular attention to the experience in the Korean market in  the 1980s.
1.  Economic Considerations
Economic theory suggests that regulation is only necessary and desirable
in cases where  independent actors in free economic exchange produce  socially
undesirable  outcomes.  These  cases  of  market  failure arise  when  there are
externalities, that is,  costs and benefits that do not appear in the calculus of
the individual agents.  This argument for regulation is well established; the
most frequently used example is  pollution, but there are important externalities
in many areas of an economy.  In the case of financial markets, what are the
market  failures that provide a justification  for regulation within  economic
theory?
Broadly  speaking.  there  are  at  least  two  reasons  why  unrestricted
exchanges between buyers  ; sellers of  financial instruments do not produce
efficient outcomes.  The first is informational asymmetries, and the second is
the risk of financial system collapse.  Let us examine each of these.
Informational asymmetries abound in financial markets,  The managers of
a firm  know more about that firm's  market prospects and investment opportunities
than do outsiders.  Financial market professionals often have access to-3
Information that is  not widely available.  In an unregulated market, therefore,
the possibility exists that unsuspecting investors will be harmed by those  with
access to information not available to the  public at large.  This matters for the
economy  because a lack  of  public confidence in securities  markets would cause the
supply of funds to the markets  to dry up, thus depriving the economy of the
benefits of a functioning markot.
These informational asymmetries are the basic justification for a large
number  of  regulations.  Disclosure  requirements  for  public  companies,  for
example, ensure that financial information is available to investors in a way
that facilitates inter-company comparisons.  It is  extremely important to note,
however, that disclosure is  only  effective if  there are  good  accounting standards
in place,  standards  that allow  investors  to assess  the financial health  of
enterprises.  Restrictions on who is licensed to serve as a broker, dealer, or
investment  banker provide a  measure of quality control.  Finally,  maintaining the
confidence of the public requires credible contract enforcement, and a pricing
system that is transparent and seen to be fair by the investing public.  All
these areas require appropriate regulation.  (Whether this is best provided by
the government or by the stock exchanges themselves in the form of accepted and
enforced "rules  of the  game" is, of  course, a separate issue,  which will be taken
up below.)
The second important market  failure is that arising from the risk of
financial system collapse.  Because financial markets lie at the heart of the
economy, the economy could be severely dameged by the widespread failure of- 4 -
intermediaries  to  meet  the  obligations  to  customers  or  other  market  professionals
(for *xample,  loss  of confidence  due to fears  about  the  solvency  of  financial
firms). Because  securities  markets  are  closely  intertwined  with  the  rest  of the
financial  system,  the  economy  needs  to  be protected  from  the  possible  spillover
effects  of  unusual  developments  in  the  securities  markets. This  type  of  market
failure  is  responsible  for  a range  of regulations,  particularly  those  governing
capital  adequacy  (and  thus  the  ability  of securities  market  firms  to  withstand
bad debts of insolvent customers  or adverse market developments)  and the
safekeeping  of customers'  funds  and  securities.
The  economic  case  for  regulation,  however,  is  by  no means  the  end  of the
story.  Regulatory  regimes  are  often  more complex  than  would  be prescribed  by
economic  theory. In  a  seminal  article  on  regulation,  Stigler  (1971)  arguled  that
there  is  a  market  for  regulation,  with  the  amount  of  regulation  determined  by the
bidding  power  of  the  different  groups  involved. Those  with  the  greatest  bidding
power end up with the right to tax the wealth of the other participants.
Although there have been a number of modifications  to Stigler's original
propositions,  which  are  well  summarized  in  Peltzman  (1989),  his  key insight  into
the  interplay  between  market  failures,  rent  extraction,  and  political  influences
remains  at  the  core  of  the  analysis  of  regulation.  In  developing  countries,  this
non-economic  dimension  to  regulation  is  often  more  explicit,  for  one  good  reason.
Whereas in developed  countries,  stock  exchanges  began  as private  responses  to
economic  needs,  in  developing  countries  they  have  more  often  been  established  by
governments  with fixed  goals  in mind.  Hence  governments  have a closer,  more
direct  stake  in ensuring  the  success  of the  market.-5-
This  explicitly  political  dimension  gives  rise  to  so called  merit
regulation; that is, the involvement of the regulatory authorities in  assessing
outcomes  rather  than Rrocedures.  Of course,  this kind  of activity  is not
confined to the developing countries alone.  The Japanese securities  market, for
example, has been noted for .:he  degree of control exercised by the authorities.
The  most  prevalent  form  of  merit  regulation  is  government  involvement  in
determining which issuers have access to the market, sometimes even setting the
prices of new issues;  this practice is  particularly common in emerging markets.
There is, of covrse, a linkage between institutional arrangements and
regulation [OECD (1987)  and (1988)].  The kind of regulation that is appropriate
depends  both on micro-level issues  such as  aspects of  market organization and on
the broader issues, such as the types of institutions providing capital market
services (i.e., universal banks, or specialized securities intermediaries) and
the  role  of  sophisticated  institutional  investors  in  the  marketplace.
(Institutional  investors  can  be presumed to  require less  protection than  ordinary
members of the investing public.)
There are, broadly speaking, two main approaches to regulation.  On the
one hand, regulation of markets may be imposed  by government authorities, backed
by law.  rhese  authorities may be a securities  commission, a government  ministry,
or cen-ral bank.  In some markets, this may take the form of direct government
controls  or  management  of  the  markets.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is
self-regulation by the  markets themselves, typically via the securities exchange
with the government's role confined to  ove:sight.  In fact, these two  approachestend  to be  complementary,  with  many day-to-day  activities  regulated by  the
markets  themselves,  even  in  countries  where  there  is  extensive  statutory
regulation.
It was  argued  above  that  there  is an  important  distinction  between
governmental  control  or  management  of  the  market  (merit  regulation)  and
governmental  activities  that  are  not  explicitly  designed  to control  market
activities.  Common forms  of direct government intervention in  the  market include
credit allocation,  control of  new  issues,  restrictions on  market  access by
non-transparent licensing procedures and regulations that hinder international
openness.  Such regulations restrict competition, but they may also limit risk:
since competitive markets allow market professionals and investors to assume
greater risk, attention must be given to the development of the regulatory tools
necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial sector as merit
regulation  is  reduced  and  market  forces  play  a  larger  role  in  resource
allocation.
There are two important features of regulation that deserve attention.
In the first place, regulation is essential to  promote public confidence and to
prevent market failure.  Secondly, regulating market activity  is not without
cost.  The principal costs are reduced competition through barriers  to entry.
The most important of these barriers are the direct result of regulations that
address the informational  asymmetry and risk of market failure issues discussed-7-
above.  Capital adequacy requirements obviously restrict freedom of entry to
securities business; so do licensing  procedures.  When  markets are predominantly
self-regulating, there is a clear danger that they will become cartels run for
the benefit of their own members rather than for the benefit of the economy as
a whole.  Regulation, therefore, poses a cost-benefit problem.  Regulation is
needed  to  maintain  public  confidence,  but  excessive  regulation  stifles
competition and innovation and inhibits markets fron.  delivering benefits to the
economy as a whole.  It is important to keep in mind that "economic growth and
innovation  spring  not  from  markets  that  are  designed  and  controlled  by
regulators, but from the efforts of private enterprises freely competing with
each other. We have also learned that some regulat_on is required to insure the
vitality of  financial  markets because investor  confidence is  critical to  vigorous
markets"  [Breeden (1991)].  The role of the government regulatory authorities
is to assure that the markets are operated in the public ir erest so that the
markets are able to  perform their essential economic functions:  capital raising
and allocative efficiency.
2.  Regulatory Structures in Developed Markets
A.  Recent Trends in Globalization and Liberalization
In recent years, there has been a clear trend toward financial market
liberalization.U  The trend toward liberalization has not been uniform, but it
has  included both developed and emerging securities markets.  This has bee.
evidenced by efforts to  enhance  market access, facilitate cross-border portfolio
investment  flows, widen  the range of  available  investment alternatives, and- 8 -
promote  competition  among  the institutions  providing  capital  market  services.
The trend toward financial  markets liberalization  no doubt has reduced the
economic  cost  of regulation.
There also appears to be a  trend toward  a gradual harmonization  of
regulatory  standards. This  has resulted  from  global  competition  in financial
services  and the  accompanying  need for  regulatory  authorities  to  work together
as  markets  have  become  more interdependent.
In the  U.S.,  the  passage  of the  Securities  Act  Amendments  of 1975  was  of
great  historical  importance.  The  Act  placed  greater  emphasis  on  competition  in
the  provision  of financial  services  by deregulating  commission  rates  on stock
transactions  and  by fostering  the developmient  of a national  market  system  in
securities.  The amendments  also gave recognition  to the need for investor
protection  in an era  of financial  market  liberalization  by granting  additional
regulatory  powers  to the  SEC [Chuppe,  Haworth  and  Watkins  (1989a)  and 1989b)].
Other countries also took steps toward securities  market reforms.Y
Canada,  whose  markets  are  closely  linked  with the  U.S.,  began  by deregulating
commission  rates  in  1983.  Australia  did likewise  one  year later. In 1986  the
U.K.  implemented  a  series  of  major  reforms  which  followed  several  years  of  policy
debate concerning  marl  ]t  structure,  competition,  and the future course of
regulation  in that country.  London's  so-called  "big bang" resulted  in the
de-regulation  of commission  rates,  a new trading  system  on the  stock  exchange,
and greater  participation  by fcreign  financial  service firms in the U.K.'s
domestic  securities  market.-9 .
Along  with the  movement  toward  a  more  competitive  market,  the  passage  of
the  Financial  Services  Act in  1986  led  to  the  establishment  of  a Securities  and
Investments  Board  (SIB) to provide government mandated oversight of  the
securities  markets  and investment  firms  through  a system  of self-regulation.
Subsequently,  Canada, France, the Netherlands  and Spain each took steps to
restructure  their securities  markets and regulations  (Chester  and Scarlett
(1957)). These  actions  were partly  a reaction  to the  restructuring  in London,
but  they  were  also  in  anticipation  of  the  development  of  a  unified  capital  market
in Europe  which will feature greater  competition  and mutAal recognition  of
regulatory  standards  within  the  12  member  European  Community  [Micossi  (1988)  and
Warren  (1990)1.
B.  Current  Regulatory  Systems  in  Developed  Markets
While  there  is  a great  deal  of  variation  in regulatory  structures  among
countries,  a regulatory  model based on the concept  of seli-regulation  with
government  oversight  is  most  commonly  employed  today. In  some  countries,  notably
Canada and Germany, securities  regulation  is administered  at the szate or
provincial  leval,  rather  than  at the  national  level  of government. Even  in  the
U.S.,  which  has a strong  national  system  of securities  regulation,  individual
states  are  also  involved  in  the  regulation  of intrastate  securities  activities.
It is  not  unusuel  for  more  than  one  government  agency  to  be involved  at
the national  level  in securities  market  regulation,  depending  on the  existing
institutional  arrangements  in  a  particular  country.  The  prudential  standards  of- 10  -
commercial banks participating in the securities market, for example, might be
regulated by  the central bank,  or other  regulatorv agencv, while  securities
firms, investment bankers or brokers are regulated by a securities commission,
or a similar organization within the ministrv of finance.
Regulatory  functions  may  also  be  performed  exclusively  by  a  stock
exchange, or by  a securities  commission  or other government  authority.  In
general, the  principal of self-regulation is  more extensively employed in  mature
markets,  while  emerging  markets  tend  to  rely  more  heavily  on  government
oversight, or direct controls.
Where universal banking  is prevalent, securities market and commercial
banking functions may be combined along with other business activities.  Banks
are sometimes required to set up separate securities affiliates, or divisions
within the bank, to perform capital market activities.  This may facilitate the
regulation of capital market activities by a specialized agency.  It may also
reduce the potential  for the transfer of risk to bank depositors,  or to the
government in those cases where deposits are government insured.  Alternatively,
the central bank (or  other bank government authority) may play an important, but
not necessarily extensive, role in regulating securities market activities.  In
Germany,  whizh is  noted for  having a system for  universal banking, the  regulation
of the operations of the individual stock exchanges falls within the domain of
the individual states, with many regulatory responsibilities delegated to the
stock exchanges through a system of self-regulation.- 11  -
In  the  world's  largest  securities  markets,  significant  regulatory
responsibilities have been delegated by the government authorities to private
sector  market  practitioners.  This  so-called  self-regulatory  model  (with
government  oversight)  has  been  used  in  the  U.S.  since  the passage  of  the
Securities Exchange-  Act of 1934. Japan also  has employed a self-regulatory  model
since the  adoption of the Securities  and Exchange Law of 1948.  With the  adoption
of the Financial Services Act in 1986, the United Kingdom was brought under a
system of self-regulation with government oversight of the securities  market and
related institutions.  Although, the basic conceptual model is the same, there
are, of course, many differences in the regulatory standards employed in each
market.
In  the  U.S.  ,  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  ("SEC")  was
established in 1934 as an independent regulatory agency with a broad mandate to
protect investors.  In general, the SEC is responsible for the registration and
supervision of broker-dealers, mutual funds and other market professionals. It
administers the full disclosure program, regulates secondary market trading in
securities, and is responsible for preventing market manipulations and insider
trading through surveillance and enforcement programs.
The SEC does not practice merit regulation.  Nevertheless, some of the
individual states practice merit regulation for intrastate securities offerings
under their respective jurisdictions.  The U.S. disclosure system, administered
by the SEC, is  based on the  principal that investors can  make informed  decisions
once adequate information is disclosed.  Market forces are relied upon to- 12 -
determine whether a particular issue should be brought to the market.  The U.S.
system is  highly competitive;  entry into the  securities  business is  open to  both
domestic and  foreign firms on the same basis.  Furthermore, the competitive
impact of regulatory proposals and actions must be taken into account  by the SEC
in establishing regulatory standards.
In Japan, the Securities and Exchange Law was patterned after the U.S.
regulations in place at that time.  A separate Securities Bureau within  the
Japanese Ministry of Finance ("MOF") is responsible for regulating securities
markets  and  firms.  The  Securities and Exchange Council, whose  members  are
appointed  by the  MOF, was established in 1952  to  provide policy advice on  matters
related to the securities markets [JSRI (1990)].
Japan's Securities Bureau is responsible for supervising a wide range of
securities activities.  In addition, futures trading is also regulated by the
Securities Bureau.  In the U.S.,  a  separate regulatory body  (the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission [CFTC])  is responsible for the regulation of futures
markets.  Although  there has been  a pronounced  trend toward liberalization,
Japanese regulators traditionally have tended to exert direct control over the
markets and market participants.
Although  disclosure principles  are well  established  in Japan, merit
regulation has been widely practiced with respect to new securities offerings.
Commission  rates  remain  fixed on  the Tokyo  Stock  Exchange.  Further,  new
financial products generally have been approved at a slower pace than has been- 13 -
the case in other major financial centers.  Interestingly, unlike the U.S. and
U.K., Japanese stock markets er.  loy  price limits on individual stocks.
Prior to the passage of the Financial Services Act, the U.K. relied upon
a system of practitioner based regulation.  The London Stock Exchange regulated
its own  members without the  benefit of formal  government oversight.  This created
a system of fixed commissions for market transactions, restrictions on foreign
ownership of firms and the separation of brokers from jobbers (market makers).
The result was a gradual decline in London's importance as a financial center.
The  reforms  of  the  market,  which  were  implemented  between  1986  and  1988,
abolished fixed commissions  and the  separation  of  brokers from  jobbers, permitted
foreign ownership and established the Securities and Investments Board ("SIB")
as the key regulatory authority.
The SIB was established to regulate securities and investment activities
through a network of self-regulatory organizations (SROs).  These SROs, which
cover all of the main areas of financial activity, are associations whose rules
of business  conduct have  to be  approved by the  SIB.  The SIB's powers  are
extensive.
The SIB, which is overseen by the Department of Trade and Industry, is
self-funded by the private sector through fees levied on regulated entities.
Anyone conducting an investment business in the U.K. is subject to supervision
by the SIB, or by a self-regulatory organization.  Government securities- 14 -
activities,  however,  must  be  conducted  through  separately  capitalized
subsidiaries supervised by the Bank of England.
Because the changes in the U.K. were both far-raaching and concentrated
in  a short  period of time, it is  possible to  examine their  effects on the  market,
and particularly on competition.  The abolition of fixed  commissions led  to lower
trading  costs,  particularly for large  customers,  and the  emergence of "executions
only" services (analogous to discount brokers in the  U.S.) for private clients.
Another important change was the drop in the average "touch."  The touch is the
spread earned by a market maker, i.e. the difference between the bid and offer
prices.  The following table shows changes in the touch as a result of London's
"big bang."- 15 -
Table 1: Market Makers' Touch aJ  Before and After the Big Bang
(percentage of share price & £l.000s)
Category of Stock  b/
Alpha  Beta  Gamma
Pre-Big Bang:
Average touch at normal size (%)  0.8  1.8  3.4
Value of average quotation (f'000)  320.8  58.9  15.3
Post-Big Bang:
Average touch at 1,000 share (0)  0.6  1.4  2.8
Value of average quotation (f'000)  4.8  2.5  1.9
Average touch at largest
SEAQ ci  quote (%)  0.8  1.7  3.2
Value of average quotation (E'000)  279.1  83.1  13.9
Notes:
a/  The touch is the difference between a  market maker's bid and offer prices.
b/  UK stocks are classified according to their liquidity: alpha stocks are
the most frequently traded, betas less frequently, and so on.
c/  SEAQ is the stock exchange's automatic quotation system, whereby bid and
offer prices are circulated.  Market makers must execute orders at their
quoted prices.  Prices are allowed to  vary depending on size of the order.
Source:  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, February 1987.
The table shows cwo important things.  First, the  average touch fell as a direct
result of increased competition among market makers.  Second, the liquidity of
the market improved.  Generally, the touch  will widen for less-liquid stocks and
for large orders, because the market maker faces a greater risk of unbalancing
his book and being unable to reverse a position quickly.  The data in the table
show the greater liquidity in the  beta and gamma stocks and the small increment
in the touch.  Of course, it remains to be seen whether these gains will be- 16 -
lasting,  but it  does  appear  that  London  has  become  more competitive  as  a global
financial  center  since  big  bang.
Despite the major changes in regulatory  regimes during the 1980s,
further  changes  are likely  in  the  years  ahead.  One  recent  change  in the  U.S.
which  is  of  particular  importance  internationally  is  the  relaxation  of  the  terms
under  which  foreign  issuers  can  raise  funds  by private  placements  in the  United
States.4/ In the U.S. and Japan there has been a  general separation  of
commercial  banking  and the investment  banking functions  of underwriting  and
dealing  in  corporate  securities. The lines  of separation  are less  clear  today
than at the start of the 1980s,  and there is a widespread  expectation  that
continuing  restrictions  will be relaxed.v Nevertheless,  within the  U.S. and
Japan  there  remain  significant  questions  concerning  the  future  role  of  commercial
and investment  banks in the economy  and the optimal  regulatory  structure  to
manage  risk  and  protect  depositors  and  investors.
Another development  currently  underway is the European Community's
movement  toward  a  unified  capital  market  ("EC  1992"). As  a  result,  the  12-member
European  Community  is  in  the  process  of adjusting  to  the  EC  directives  concerning
securities  market  and  banking  regulations.  The  EC  directives  provide  for  certain
minimal standards  and  the mutual recognition  of each country's regulatory
safeguards.  The  end  result  will  be a  more  competitive  European  capital  market.
The  events  in Europe  may also  be  viewed  as part  of the  global  trend  toward  the
integration  of financial  markets which has important  implications  for both
developed  and  emerging  securities  markets  [Padoa-Schioppa  (1988),  Key  (1989)  and
Chuppe,  Haworth  and  Watkins  (1989b)].- 17 -
3.  Regulatory  Systems  in  Emerging  Markets
The  clear  trend  in  OECD  markets has  been  one  of  regulatory
liberalization  and increased  openness  to the international  market,  in the  form
of  international  investment  and  participation  in  the markets themselves.
Obviously,  these  changes  have  had  implications  foz  developing  countries  as  well.
In this section,  a  brief  overview  of regulatory  systems  in  emerging  markets  is
provided,  before  turning  to a more detailed  review  of the  Korean  system.
Although a variety of regulatory  structures  have evolved in both
developed  and  emerging  securities  markets,  certain  elements  are  common  to  nearly
all markets.  The type of regulatory  structure  that is appropriate  for a
particular  emerging  market  will depend  on  the  types  of  market  participants  that
conduct  a securities  business,  the  level  of  market  development  and  the  extent  to
which  infrastructure  associated  with  the  operation  of a  securities  market  is  in
place.
At  the  early  stages  of  market  development, governments or
quasi-government  organizations  (e.g.,  a  government  operated  stock  exchange)  tend
to  exert  a  greater  influence  on  the  market. This  often  occurs  because  the  basic
infrastructure  for  a securities  market  is  not in  place. It  would  be difficult,
for example, for a market to rely entirely upon disclosure  principles  in
countries where accounting standards do not  even exist, or the level of
investors'  knowledge  of  securities  instruments  is low.  While  most developing
countries tend to rely upon self-regulation  to some extent to supplement
government  regulatior,  the  concept  of self-regulation  is less  clearly  defined- 18 -
than in mature markets.  Moreover,  in most  emerging markets,  the regulatory
authorities have a mandate to foster the development of the market as well as to
perform basic regulatory functions.
The extent of government delegation of regulatory responsibilities to
a stock exchange or dealers' association varies greatly from country to country.
In instances  where the stock exchange is  owned by the government.  concept of
self-regulation is less clear than in markets where the stock exchange is owned
by the private sector.
The  type  of  regulatory  structure  will  also  depend  on  the  extent
specialized  financial  firms  perform  the  functions  of  broker,  dealer,  or
investment banker.  In some developing countries, notably the  Philippines and
Turkey,  commercial banks  are  the principal  providers  of  investment  banking
services.  In contrast, specialized securities firms play a larger role in some
of the largest emerging markets, notably, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,  India and
Mexico.  Yet,  in each of  these countries,  securities commissions  have been
established (or,  in the case of  Thailand is in the  process of being established)
as the  principal regulatory body for  capital  market activities.  India,  which  has
both securities and  merchant  bankirg firms, recently  established a  Securities and
Exchange Board (SEBI).  Legislation empowering the Board with statutory powers
has  not  yet  been  enacted.  The  SEBI  is expected  to have  broad  regulatory
responsibilities over India's securities markets and market participants.
While universal banking  is permitted  in the Philippines, independent
securities  firms have historically played a prominent role in the securities- 19 -
markets.  The central bank regulates the prudential standards of the uniiversal
banks, while the Philippines Securities and Exchange Commission regulates the
activities  of  securities  firms,  the  new  issues  market  and  tie  two  stock
exchanges.  In Turkey,  universal banks play  a dominant  role  in the capital
markets,  yet, the  number of securities intermediaries  and independent  brokers has
been growing in recent years.  A Capital Markets Board regulates both securities
intermediaries and the capital market activities of banks, while the Treasury
Department  has overall  responsibilitv for the  regulation  of the  banks. Currently,
individual brokers are regulated solely by the stock exchange.
In  Thailand, both securities companies ai  -4 finance companies are active
participants  in  the  securities  markets.  Currently,  both  are  under  the
supervision of the central bank.  There is, however, a policy debate in that
country concerning the desirability of limiting the securities business only to
specialized  securities  firms.  In  Thailand,  the  stock  exchange,  which  is
government owned, has direct responsibility for the supervision of the market
place.  By tradition, the head of the Fiscal Policy Office, within the  Ministry
of Finance, normally serves as Chairman of the stock exchange.  Thailand is in
the process  of  establishing  a  securities  regulatory  body  whose  duties  and
responsibilities will be determined by legislation.
4.  The Korean Regulatory Experience
The Korean securities  market has been among the largest of the emerging
securities markets  for several years, and grew rapidly in the 1980s.  Stock
market capitalization grew from 2,527 billion Won  (US$3,8  billion)  in 1980 to- 20  -
95,477 billion  Won  (US$140.9 billion)  in 1989.  During  this period,  annual
turnover on the Korean Stock Exchange also increased rapidly from 1,134 billion
Won (US$1.9  billion) to 81,200  billion Won (US$121.3  billion) [see  IFC Fact Book
(1990)].  Reflecting  this  growth,  the number  of  branch  offices  of Korean
securities companies expanded from  229 in 1980 to  521 at  mid-year 1989,  while the
number of employees grew from 4,816 to 22,194.
A.  The Regulatory Structure
The basic regulatory framework in  Korea was established in  1962  with the
adoption of the Korean Securities and Exchange Law ("KSE Law").  The extent of
government  control over the market, while  liberalized in the 1980s, remains
extensive in Korea.
The basic  system is one of self-regulation with extensive government
oversight  and  control  over  markets,  securities  firms  and  international
participation.  There are three key institutions in this system, the Korean
Securities' Dealers Association (KSDA), the  Korean Stock Exchange (KSE)  and the
Korean Securities and Exchange Commission (KSEC).
The KSDA was established in  1953.  All securities companies in  Korea are
required to  be members of the  KSDA, which has operated as a  self-regulatory body
since  it was  founded.  The KSDA  has  a wide  range  of  responsibilities  for
self-regulation,  training securities market  professionals,  the mediation  of
conflicts among member firms and the registration of over-the-counter stocks.- 21 -
The  KSE, established in 1953,  was converted into  a  government controlled
corporation  in  1963, but  was  privatized  and  reorganized  into a  membership
organization in  1988 [KSDA  (1989),  KSEC (1989  and 1987)].  It  has self-regulatory
responsibilities for  the listing  and  delisting of  securities,  market  surveillance
and listed companies' disclosure.  Any corporate development that might affect
the value of a listed company's shares must be reported to the KSE.  A listed
company must also make direct disclosures to the investing public of important
events that may affect the value of shares traded on the stock _xchange [KSE
(1989)].
The KSEC was established as a regulatory body subject to overall policy
guidance from the Ministry of Finance  (MOF) by the KSE Law of 1962.  Actions
adopted  by the  KSEC must be reportcd to the  MOF. If the  MOF believes it is in the
public interest, it  may "repeal  or suspend" resolutions adopted  by the  KSEC [BOK
(1985)]. Nevertheless, the  KSEC  has  broad authority to  make decisions  concerning
the Korean securities markets and the administration of the  KSE Law.  The KSEC,
however, is not an independent agencv as that term is normally applied in the
context of the  U.S. regulatory system.  The Securities Supervisory Board ("SSB")
serves as the executive body of the KSEC whose Chairman also serves as Governor
of the SSB [Horch (1989), Park (1989)  and KSEC (1989)].
The KSEC has a  broad range  of regulatory  responsibilities related to  the
operation  of  the  stock  exchange  and  over-the-counter  market,  corporate
disclosure,  margin  trading,  takeover  activity  and  accounting  and  auditing
practices.  Besides regulating the  securities  market and  market  participants, the
KSEC, in conjunction with the MOF, also exerts a substantial degree of direct- 22 -
control  over  the  domestic  market,  market  participants,  and  cross-border
securities  activities  by domestic  and international  issuers,  securities  firms  and
investors.  In addition to its  regulatory functions, the  KSEC has a  broad mandate
to facilitate the development of the Korean securities markets.
The KSEC also has set guidelines for the financial  management of listed
companies, dividend policy and the issuance of new securities in both domestic
and international markets.  Large acquisitions are also controlled by the KSEC.
Prior approval must be obtained from the  KSEC for any purchases over a specified
amount (i.e., 10 percent) of outstanaing shares of a listed company. The KSEC
controls the terms and interest rate on margin loans.  It also determines the
issues eligible for margin trading, margin requirements and the maximum amount
of credit that may be extended by securities firms.
In Korea, securities firms are  licensed by the MJnistry of Finance
("MOF") to act as brokers,  dealer or underwriters.  In 1989, all  25 Korean
securities firms  operating at rhat time were licensed to engage in  each of these
three basic securities activities.  As a result of actions taken in 1983, large
Korean securities firms (i.e., those with capital stock in excess of 20 billion
Won) were permitted to  guarantee corporate  bonds, underwrite and sell commercial
paper and serve as underwriters in overseas securities offerings.- 23 -
B.  Liberalization in the 1980s
At the start of the 1980s, Korea recognized the need to make its
domestic securities  market responsive to  developments in  world financial  markets.
In 1981, Korea was  the world's  26thl  largest market measured by stock market
capitalization and the 18th largest in terms of the dollar volume of trading.
Ry  -cr  t4  =  f t1he  decade,  Korea  had  become  the  world's  tentl  largest  stock  market
measured by equity  market capitalization and fifth largest  measured  by the  dollar
volume of trading.  Yet, the regulatory framework is rather restrictive for so
large a  market.  For example, according to the IFC Fact  Book, 17  emerging  markets
that are smaller than Korea have a more liberal policy toward foreign  purchases
of locally listed stocks.  Moreover, Korea was one of only four emerging market
countries in 1989 that limited foreign portfolio  investment to special funds
only.  Seventeen others were classified by the IFC as free or relatively free  at
the end of 1989, while only  four emerging markets were completely closed to
foreign portfolio investment at that time.
In the 1980s, a  number of  steps were undertaken to liberalize the  Korean
domestic securities  market and to open  up the  market to  foreign financial service
firms and investors. Yet, the extent of change has been somewhat limited, given
the  rapid  pace  of  globalization  of  securities  markets,  financial  market
liberalization  and  economic  integration  in the  1980s.  The  results of  the
liberalization process in Korea are summarized in Table 2.- 24 -
Table 2:  Regulation and Control of the
Korean Securities Markets: 1980-1989
Market Activity  1980  1989
Domestic Listed  Listing  Listing
Issues  Standards  Standards
OTC Market
Stocks  None  Controlled
Bonds  Yes  Yes
Pricing of New Issues  Controlled  Partially  de-controlled
Market Access by
Securities Firms
Domestic  Controlled  Controlled
Foreign  None  Limited Access
Banks  None  Limited Access
Margin Loans  Controlled  Controlled
Brokerage Commissions  Fixed  Partially deregulated
Ownership of KSE  Government  Private
Takeover Activity  Controlled  Controlled
Foreign Portfolio
Investment in Korea
Direct  None  None
Special Funds  None  Limitations
Int  Bonds  None  Limitations
Korean Portfolio
Investment Abroad
Direct  None  None
Special Funds  None  None




Bonds  None  Limitations
Stocks  None  None
Korean Securities  None  Liberal Policy
Firms Abroad- 25 -
There  are  two  aspects  of  the  regulatory  framework  that  are  particularly
interesting.  The  first  is  connected  with  restrictions  on  foreign  participation,
and the second  with the  continued  practice  of administrative  control  over the
market  in the  form  of merit  regulation.
Internationalization
In January,  1981 the Korean  Government  announced  a policy  that  would
lead  to the  gradual  internationalization  of the  Korean  securities  market. The
announced  plan called  for  liberalization  through  a four-step  process.  First,
indirect  access  to  the  Korean  market  was  planned  by  means  of internationai  funds.
Next,  beginning  in 1985,  foreign  securities  firms  were supposed  to be able to
establish  branch offices in Korea on the basis of reciprocity  and foreign
investors  were to be granted  limited  direct  access  to the Korean  securities
market.  Finally,  Korean investors  were to be permitted  to freely  invest  in
foreign  securities  in  the  early  1990s  [KSE  (1982),  KSEC  (1984,  Park (1989)].  Of
these  four  steps,  only  the  first  has  been fully  carried  out.  In  November  1990,
the  Government  announced  a  revised  plan  for  a  two-stage  liberalization.  The  plan
would  allow  ten  foreign  securities  firms  to  open  branch  offices;  however,  only
firms  that  have  had representative  offices  in Seoul  for  two  years  could  so.  A
license  permitting  broking,  dealing  and underwriting  would require  operating
capital  of 20  billion  Won ($28  mn). Joint  ventures  (with  for-- 4gners  owning  less
than  50 percent  of the  equity)  would  be allowed  to obtain  a seat  on the  Stock
Exchange,  but only if the  existing  25  Korean  member  firms  agree.- 26 -
The second stage of the liberalization program is expected to occur in
1992, when foreigners will be allowed to invest directly in Korean equities.
As indicated above, there has been some limited foreign access to the
Korean market.  On November 19, 1981 two international trusts were offered to
foreign investors.  This event  was important because foreign portfolio investors
were able to gain access to the Korean securities market for the first time by
this  means.  The Korean International  Trust was launched  as the first in a  series
of international funds  with an initial offering of  US$15 million.  On August 22,
1984 the Korea Fund, a closed-end fund listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
became available to U.S. investors.  Subsequently, on April 4, 1987, a second
closed-end fund (the Korea-Europe Fund) was  listed on London's International
Stock Exchange.  The size of these funds was expanded though second and third
offerings.  These funds proved very popular with investors, and moved to large
premiums over net asset value:  the downturn in the Korean market that began in
mid-1989, however, has eroded these premiums sharply.
In 1985, companies listed on  the Korean Stock Exchange were granted
limited authorization to raise capital in the international bond market through
the issuance of convertible bonds, bonds with warrants, and depository receipts
in  overseas  markets, but restrictions  were placed on the  number of  offerings that
could be brought to the market, use of proceeds and conversion into shares.  In
1987, the Korean Government allowed convertible bonds issued by large Korean
corpora'.ions  in international markets  to be converted  into shares.  Foreign
investors as a group are able to  hold 15 percent of the paid-in capital of large
Korean companies that have issued convertible bonds in international markets.- 27 -
However, an individual foreign investor or institution may not hold more than
3 percent.  In 1988, Korea took steps to liberalize the issuance of Eurobonds by
Korean companies so that the proceeds of an offering could be repatriated.  In
order  to take advantage of this liberalization, the funds had to be used to
retire existing bank loans.  Prior to this policy change, Korean companies had
been required to invest overseas the proceeds of international bond offerings
[KSDA (1989)] °!
These  restrictions  on  foreign  investment  have  been  paralleled  by
restrictions on the ability of foreign firms to provide financial services in
Korea.  In the 1980s, foreign securities firms gained only limited access to the
Korean securities markets and were not permitted to  become members of the stock
exchange.  Moreover,  foreign  firms could  not  act  as brokers  or  investment
advisors, but were free to provide research services and deal in Eurobonds on
behalf of Korean investors.
Not surprisingly, the impact of these restrictions has been to limit
competition in the  provision of financial services in  the 1980s.  The net income
of securities firms grew from 5 billion Won in 1983 to 466 billion Won in 1988,
yet the number of licensed securities companies fell from 27 in 1980 to only 25
in 1983 and, thereafter, remained constant [KSDA (1989)].  Some competition is
provided by other financial institutions, since  commercial banks, merchant  banks
and finance companies are permitted to engage in a limited range of securities
activities.  However, only securities firms are authorized to underwrite equity
securities and corporate bonds.- 28 -
Even with its rapid growth in the 1980s, the Korean securities market
has been rather slow to open up to foreign participation and investment.  The
KSEC maintains tight restrictions on foreign portfolio investment and foreign
securities firms'  participation in the  Korean securities  market.  Direct foreign
portfolio investment is prohibited.
Merit Regulation
There was considerable liberalization of restrictions on the domestic
market over the 1980s,  even though  some important  restrictions remained in  place.
In this section, these measures are reviewed.
Partial  deregulation  began  in  1981.  The  issuing  criteria  for
non-guaranteed corporate  bonds were relaxed along with issuance  criteria for  new
shares.  Underwriting commissions were reduced in order to stimulate new issues
of securities  [KSE (1982)].  On April 1, 1982 the KSL was revised in several
important respects regarding the issuance of registration statements for public
offerings, insider trading and the supervision of securities companies.
In 1983, tax privileges granted listed companies were reduced so that
all  companies would  be  taxed at  the same  30 percent  rate  except  for large
unlisted companies.  The tax laws had been used as a means both to stimulate
public offering of shares and to create disincentives for companies that had
elected not to go public [KSE (1983)].- 29  -
In  1983,  foreign  securities  firms were  granted  permission  to make
capital contributions in Korean securities firms.  However, foreign securities
firms  were not authorized to  become members of the  Korean Stock Exchange.  At the
same time, large Korean  securities firms  (those with capital  stock above  20
billion  Won)  were  authorized  to  expand  beyond  the  traditional  activities
permitted under the existing KSE Law.
In 1983, the Government also announced that new issues of securities
could be offered at market price under specified conditions. The standards  were
redefined in 1988.  Consequently, corporations were required  to both satisfy
certain standards and calculate a theoretical value for the shares based on a
specific formula.  To offer shares at the market price, the market price had to
equal or exceed 1.1 times the par value and meet an annual investment returns
test for  the  prior two years.  The company must also expect rising net income  over
the next two years [KSDA (1989)].
A further liberalization in the domestic securities market occurred in
1987 with the opening of an over-the-counter market for non-listed stocks. The
over-the-counter  market had  previously been  limited to  bond issues.  The following
year the  KSE,  which had operated  as a  government-run  non-profit corporation since
1963, was  privatized  into a membership  organization.  The  system  of  fixed
brokerage commissions on the stock  exchange was relaxed somewhat, being replaced
by a system that permitted limited  negotiation.  In 1988, Korea accessed to the
status of an IMF "Article 8 Nation," and the  Government also announced a plan of
deregulation  with respect to  the  management of securities  companies [KSE  (1989)].- 30 -
Financial  market  liberalizations  were  accompanied  by  programs  to
privatize Korean state-owned enterprises.  This helped increase equity market
capitalization and brought new investors into the Korean securities  market.  The
shares of Pohang Iron and Steel Company were privatized in 1988 with a listing
on the  Korean Stock Exchange followed in 1989 by the privatization of shares in
Korea Electric Power Corporation.  Korea encouraged small investor  participation
in these privatization programs by reserving shares in the public offering for
company employees and moderate-to-low income wage earners [Korea (1989)].
The liberalizations in the securities markets also took  place at a time
when Korea was attempting to  reduce government controls over the banking sector.
In the 1970s,  Korea used extensive credit controls and other  means to direct  bank
funding to favored industries.  This, of course,  lead to a misallocation of
resources and  prudential problems  in the banking  sector.  It may  also have
contributed to the rapid expansion of the securities market to the extent that
non-favored enterprises were denied access to bank credit.
Liberalizations  in  the  banking  sector  were  intended  to  eliminate
preferential  lending rates and to reduce the Government's  involvement in the
banking sector through a privatization program.  All nationwide city banks in
which the Government had been a major sharRholder were privatized.  The Bank of
Korea's policy actions were designed to move  from a system of direct credit
control  to  an  indirect  system  based  on  reserve  requirements,  open  market
operations and rediscount facilities [Cho 1986 and Kim (1988)].- 31 -
Throughout  this  period  of  liberalization,  the  Government  actively
promoted the development of the stock market.  The primary focus of this effort
was a system of tax incentives and disincentives for certain large closely held
companies that did not choose to enter the public market.  However, government
directives even required certain large closely held companies to go public.
In certain respects, government involvement in the market has remained
very strong.  Perhaps the clearest indication of this is the official response
to the decline in the stock  market that  began it.  mid-1989.  Worried that the fall
in  the  market would have an  adverse impact,  the  Government launched, in  May 1990,
a two trillion Won  (US$2.8 billion) market stabilization fund.  It was later
doubled in value.  Modelled after a fund set up in Japan  in the mid-1960s to
stabilize the Tokyo market, the purpose of the fund  was to brake the rapid fall
in share prices that was thought to  be harming investor confidence.  By the end
of 1990, it  was estimated that the  Korean stabilization fund  had acquired almost
5  percent of listed shares.  Korea has not been alone in introducing such a fund
in response to market weakness: there was, for example, a similar operation in
Thailand,  itself a repeat of a similar fund introduced on the Bangkok market
after the global equity crash in  October 1987.  Such funds may well be too small
to have  any  impact on  the market  beyond  sending  a  signal and  acting  as a
confidence booster, but to the extent that they materially affect prices, it is
not  at  all  clear  that  they  are  desirable.  If  severe monetary  tightening
threatens to produce a recession, then asset purchases by the authorities may be
an appropriate way to inject liquidity into an economy:  but a deliberate attempt
by the  Government to  maintain share  prices at  what it  regards as  desirable levels
is hardly consistent with allowing the market to perform its economic roles.- 32  -
5.  Regulatory  Policy  Implications  for  Emerging  Markets
Securities  markets  can  facilitate  the  efficient  allocation  of resources
in the  economy  and  can also  help foster  competition  in the  financial  sector  by
providing  an  alternative  to  government  directed  funding  or  to  supplement  existing
sources  of  private  funding  through  the  banking  system. For securities  markets
to allocate  resources to their most productive  uses, regulation should  be
confined  to  that  needed  to  correct  the  market  failures  that  arise  in  unregulated
markets. This  has a  number  of important  implications.
Firstly,  it is  more d^sirable  to  allow  the  market  to  set  prices  than  to
have direct  government  intervention  in the pricing  and selection  of issues.
Markets  can  perform  their  allocative  function  only if  prices  are competitively
based  upon  the  independent  judgment  of investors  with  adequate  information.  To
accomplish  efficient  pricing,  therefore,  it  must  be the  case  that  investors  have
access  to  consistent  and  reliable  financial  information  about  listed  companies.
To  accomplish this, standardized accounting rules  and  clear  disclosure
requirements  need  to  be in  place. The  relative  quality  of issues  traded  in  the
market  can  be maintained  through  adequate  listing  standards  or by establishing
objective  guidelines  (minirnum  criteria  in  terms  of  profits,  revenues,  assets  or
net .%-rth)  for  new issues. Subject  to  meeting  these  minimum  standards,  market
forces should then determine  the relative  merits of a particular  security
offering. It  should  be  noted  that  accounting  standards  and  disclosure  rules  are
more  important  as  a  market  moves  from  governmental  control  over  pricing  to  market
determination.  Supervision  of  the  market  trading  systems  will also  be  needed  to
prevent  market  manipulations  and  to ensure  that  insiders  do not  use  privileged- 33 -
information to the disadvantage of public investors.  Governments are probably
better  employed  in educating investors about the risks and rewards of owning
marketable securities than in  trying to  determine the  prices of those  securities.
Secondly, restrictions on entry into the financial services sector are
appropriate to the  extent they  are  concerned with capital adequacy and  measurable
competence requirements.  Throughout the world, however, such restrictions have
sometimes been concerned with limiting competition for established firms than
with correcting possible market failures.
Thirdly,  restrictions  on  foreign  share  ownership  can  find  no
jus:ification in the economic theory of regulation.  To the extent governments
wish to restrict foreign participation  in their economies, such restrictions
should apply whether or nor corporations are listed.  Moreover, there are good
reasons for  believing that foreign investment can help market development.  The
activities of  foreign institutional investors  can improve  the flow  of information
about company prospects.  To the extent that institutional investors are less
likely to suffer from informational asymmetry than individual investors,  market
development  can be  aided by  allowing  foreign institutions  to  invest and by
encouraging the development of domestic institutions.
It is abundantly clear that regulatory regimes are far more complex in
reality than would be suggested by  theory.  Moreover, the example of Korea,
widely recognized as a successful example of stock  market development, could  be
taken  to  indicate  that  an  interventionist  regime  is  no  barrier  to  such
development.  Nonetheless. one consequence of the Korean regime has been  the- 34 -
entry barriers faced by new providers of financial services, and it  is not clear
that these have served a purpose beyond enhancing the profitability of existing
providers.
One further important observation is the following.  There appears to
be a trend towards the  harmonization of regulatory structures in the  world.  This
is  happening with respect to  both the  form and the content  of regulations.  There
has been a tendency in  recent years to  strengthen government oversight of  markets
with an appropriate delegation of regulatory responsibility to stock exchanges,
or other self-regulatory organizations.  This is happening in all three of the
most important  areas of  regulation: the  new issues  market and related  disclosure,
accounting and listing standards; secondary  market trading activities including
market  surveillance and  enforcement; and, thirdly,  the regulation of market
practitioners  through  registration  and  prudential  standards.  Developing
countries anxious to allow  their markets to  provide a link  with the  world capital
market cannot afford to ignore this.
The  trend  toward  the  liberalization  of  financial  narkets  in  both
developed and developing countries is part of a general recognition that free
markets  normally work better  than government controls.  As  govermnents move
toward market-oriented policies, securities markets often become an important
component of the capital market and market regulation tends to supplant direct
controls.  This  appears  true in both  domestic  and  international  securities
markets.7  In  the  1980s,  Korea,  like  other  developed  and  emerging  market
countries, began to  rely more heavily on the private sector and market forces to
direct  the  allocation  of  resources  in  its  economy.  This  has  important- 35 -
implications for the regulation  of securities  markets.  As market forces supplant
government management or control of the market,  it is important that investor
safeguards be maintained.  In some markets,  this may  involve building sound
regulatory  structures  for  the  first  time  to  replace  outmoded  systems  of
government control and  management of the financial sector.  Such systems  need to
be developed in the light of the market failures that make them necessary and
should  provide  the  least  possible  opportunity  for  rent  extraction  by  any
individual interest group.
The challenge of  developing appropriate regulatory safeguards is  perhaps
greatest for those nations that have chosen to move from a centrally planned to
a  market economy.  in countries where the  basic institutional structures are  not
in place. private property rights must be defined, adequate accountilig  systems
must be established, and specialized institutions must be developed to perform
the functions of broker, dealer and investment banker.  These may be created
either within  the existing  financial sector, or, by creating  an environment
conducive to the organization of new business entities that will perform these
important economic functions. The basic  building blocks for a  securities  markets
must be established along with appropriate regulatory safeguards.
000- 36 -
Endnotes
1.  The  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  has  defined  emerging
securities markets to include the securities markets of developing and newly
industrialized  nations.  The equity  market capitalization  of the  emerging  markets
grew from  US$ 86.1 billion to US$ 611.1 billion between year-end 1980 and 1989.
2.  For a discussion of these trends, see: Chuppe, T., H. Haworth  and M.
Watkins, "Global Finance: Causes, Consequences and Prospects for the Future,"
Global  Finance  Journal,  Volume  1,  Number  1,  Fall  1989,  JAI  Press,  Inc.,
Greenwich, Connecticut and London, England.  A more comprehensive discussion of
this topic is  contained in an  unpublished paper by the  same authors entitled "The
Securities Markets  in the  1980s: A Global  Perspective,"  Office  of  Economic
Analysis, U.S. Secutrities  and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.,  January 16,
1989.  Also, see "Factors  Affecting  The Trend Toward Internationalization  of
Securities  Markets,"  The Internationalizacion  of  Securities  Markets, Staff  Report
to the Senate  Committee  on Banking,  Hlousing  and Urban  Affairs and the House
Committee  on Energy and Commerce,  U.S. Securities  and Exchange  Commission,
Washington,  D.C.,  July  27, 1987,  Chapter  2, pp.  1-88;  and  G. Broker,  Trends  in
Banking  Structure  and  Regula  -ion  in  OECD  Countries:  Competition  in  Banking,  OECD,
Paris,  1989.
3.  See:  "Securities  Markets  in  the  1980s: A  Global  Perspective"  and  "Global
Finance: Causes,  Consequences  and Prospects  for  the  Future,"  op.cit.
4.  On April 19, 1990 the SEC adopted  Rule 144A.  It was intended  to offer
increased  liquidity  to tl  e private placement  market and facilitate  foreign
issuers'  access  to U.S. institutional  investors.  Rule 144A liberalizes  the
private  placement  market  by providing  a "safe  harbor' from registration  for
resale  of securities  to qualified  institutional  buyers  ("QIBs"). QIBs are no
longer  required  to  hold such  securities  for  a two-year  period  before  they  can  be
sold.  The  potential  for  an active  secondary  market  in unregistered  securities
among  QIBs  was created  with the  adoption  of the  rule.  In order  to qualify,  an
i4nstitutional  investor  must  own  and  manage  $100  million  in  securities.  Banks  and
savings  and  loans  associations  ntust  meet an additional  net  worth  test in  order
to qualify.  In order  to take into account  the effects  of deposit  insurance,
banks and savings  and loans  must have a net worth of at least $25 million.
Broker-dealers  are considered  qualified  if they own or manage $10  million in
securities,  or if they  act  as riskless  principles  for  QIBs.  Investment  bankers
will not  likely  underwrite  an issue  rated  lower  than  A  because  the  firm  will  be
subject to 100 percent  capital  charge  under the SEC's  net capital  rule.  In
effect,  the  security  will  be treated  like  a  non-liquid  asset. Securities  rated
at least  A by two  rating  agencies  receive  a capital  charge  ('haircut')  of only
10  percent  under  the  net  capital  rule. The  adoption  of the  Rule  provides  an  easy
avenue  for  a  U.S.  or foreign  issuer  to launch  an international  offering  in  both
the  U.S. and the  Eurobond  market  with relative  ease. Foreign  issuers  can  also
gain  access  to  a  relatively  large  number  of  U.S. institutional  investors. It  is37  -
too early  to judge  the ultimate  impact of  the Rule. The  resale  market  for
privately placed issues  has the  potential to evolve into a global trading market
closely linked to the Eurobond market.
5.  For a review of  some likely reforms in the U.S.A.,  see Goldman  Sachs,
Economic Research:  Financial Market Perspectives, December 1990.
6.  "Korea  Sets  Timetable  for  Financial  Market  Reform,"  Financial  Times,
London, November 14,  1988, at page 27 and "Liberalization Hints Give Boost to
South Korean Stock Market," Financial Tines, London, October 18, 1988.
7.  Indeed, the pace of financial  market liberalization often occurs faster
in international markets than in domestic markets.  R.egulatory  liberalization
appears to have  facilitated the rapid growth of the non-U.S. dollar currency
secrors of the international bond markets during the 1980s.  See Chuppe, T. H.
Haworth, M. Watkins, "Public  Policy Toward the International Bond  Markets in the
1980s," Advances  in Financial  Planning  and Forecasting,  Volume  IV,  Part B,
JAI Press, Inc., forthcoming 1990.- 38 -
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